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Is Logic the Science of the Laws of 
Truth?
UWE MEIXNER
1 Frege’s Characterization of Logic
In a paper published in 1918, ‘Der Gedanke. Eine logische Untersuchung’ 
(‘Thought. A Logical Investigation’), Frege says (p. 30, my translation): 
‘As the word “ beautiful”  to esthetics and the word “ good” to ethics, thus 
the word “ true”  is pointing out a direction to logic. All sciences have truth 
as their aim, logic, however, is, in addition, involved with truth in a quite 
special manner. ... It is the task of logic to cognize the laws of truth [liter­
ally. the laws of being true].’ Frege makes this more precise. He distin­
guishes normative laws from descriptive laws. The laws of truth are, like 
the laws of nature, descriptive laws, although, of course, they can be taken 
as a basis for prescriptions, and thus as a basis for normative laws: for the 
laws o f rationally correct thinking. The laws of truth must, in turn, accord­
ing to Frege be distinguished from the laws of nature; the latter describe the 
invariant form o f what is happening in time; the laws of truth, however, 
describe timeless being. Still fighting psychologism, Frege strongly empha­
sizes that logic is not concerned with the psychological laws of factual 
thinking; the task o f logic is to discover the laws of truth, not the empiri­
cally descriptive laws of actually occurring believing or thinking (p. 31).
Frege arrives at a general characterization o f what the laws o f  truth con­
sist in (p. 31, my translation): Tn the laws o f  truth the meaning o f the word
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“ true” is unfolded.’ However, it seems that there is not much of interest to 
be expected from an investigation of such laws of truth, for a few lines fur­
ther down Frege declares (p. 32) that any attempt to define truth [literally: 
being true] is bound to fail, due to circularity, since, according to Frege, the 
concept of truth must already be given - given as a primitive - in order to 
decide whether the allegedly truth-defining concepts apply in any consid­
ered case: for the question whether they apply is the question whether it is 
true that they apply. He comes to the conclusion (p. 32, my translation): ‘It 
is likely that the content of the word “ true”  is totally singular and indefin­
able.’
In a much earlier manuscript - the fragment ‘Logik’ from 1897 - Frege 
had already arrived at practically the same positions.1 There he writes (p. 
39, my translation): ‘Truth apparently is something so primitive and simple 
as to be not reducible to anything yet simpler.’ And: ‘Logic is the science of 
the most general laws of truth [literally: of being true].’ Frege adds apolo­
getically: ‘Perhaps one finds that one cannot think of anything totally de­
terminate that is meant by these words. Inaptness of the author and of lan­
guage may be the cause of this. But the intention was only to give a rough 
characterization of the aim [of logic]. What is missing must be supple­
mented by the carrying out [of logical investigations].’ Now, Frege cer­
tainly carried out many logical investigations where he clarified many 
things in and around logic; but it can hardly be said that his very characteri­
zation of logic as the science o f the laws o f truth has been clarified by these 
investigations further than it is explicated by his rather scant remarks that 
he explicitly attaches to the characterization. At least, however, in the 
course of his logical investigations, Frege amply provided us with examples 
of what he thought are laws of truth. But are those examples indeed what 
Frege thought they are? Are even the axioms and theorems of a classical 
propositional calculus laws of truth? Note that if logic is to be the science 
of the laws of truth, it is not enough that those axioms and theorems can in 
some sense also be construed to be laws of truth. No, they must be primar­
ily and essentially laws of truth - albeit that need not be obviously or trivi­
ally so.
1 Already in the introduction to the first volume of Grundgesetze der Arithmetik (Funda­
mental Laws o f  Arithmetic) published in 1893, we find Frege asserting that logical laws are 
laws of truth (see p. XVI). But there (pp. XV-XV1I) the attack against psychologism is para­
mount (logical laws, says Frege, are laws of being true, and not natural laws of holding to be 
true), and the definition of logic as the science of the laws of truth is only implicit, but never­
theless unmistakably implied. Thus, in the Grundgesetze, we find that definition coupled with 
Frege’s assumption of having faultlessly shown (p. XXVI) that ‘arithmetic is nothing but fur­
ther developed logic’ (p. VII) - without Frege being aware that there might be a problem in this 
coupling. See for this Section 1.4 below.
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1.1 ... and Modern Logic
But let us first, before tackling the question just posed, look beyond the 
confines o f classical Fregean logic. Let us consider logic with the very large 
scope it has acquired today. Logic in its modem form, as currently prac­
ticed, is certainly not the science of the laws of troth, nor is its relation to 
truth in any way special. Of course, like all sciences, modem logic too is 
aiming at truth, namely, like each and every science, at the particular troths 
it is interested in, for example: Is it true that formula F is provable in system 
S? Is it true that system S is deductively equivalent to system S'? Is it true 
that system S is sound and complete with respect to the model structures in 
set M? Indeed, there are many truths modem logic is interested in, but none 
of them is a law of troth in approximately the sense Frege seems to have in 
mind.
Moreover, modem logic is certainly interested in the axioms and theo­
rems of logical calculi (as has just been said, at least some of those formulas 
are intended by Frege to be laws of truth); but modem logic is not interested 
in them qua laws of truth. In the first place, the word ‘true’ does not even 
occur in them. But this is not a serious objection, since we can insert ‘it is 
true that’ in front o f any sentential part of any formula without changing its 
meaning. The second objection is decisive: Modem logic proceeds fairly 
close to the maxim: ‘Give me the axiomatic system, whatever it is, and I 
give you its models (if there are any).’ Or vice versa: ‘Give me the models, 
whatever they are, and I give you the axiomatic system for them (if there is 
one).’ Take a tense-logical principle like FpzFFp. This formula (expressing 
the density of the temporal ordering) is logically valid with respect to an 
appropriate set of model structures. But it is not logically valid with respect 
to a certain other set o f model structures; with respect to that set we find, on 
the contrary, the discreteness-formula Pq A  p A  ->Fp z> P(Fp A  ->FFp) to be 
logically valid. The modem logician is happy to formulate two alternative 
systems, one in which FpziFFp is provable, and one in which it isn’t prov­
able, but Pq A  p A  —>Fp z) P(Fp A  —FFp) is. Thus, although modem logi­
cians are interested in formulating axiomatic systems, they are qua modern 
logicians not interested in assuring that those systems codify laws of truth 
or even something true. The truth o f  their axiomatic systems - contrary to 
the truth about them - does not matter to modem logicians qua modem lo­
gicians. It is enough if some interest attaches to the provable formulas 
some interest derived from some envisaged application - be it artificial in­
telligence, the semantics of natural language, or even merely some puzzling 
argument in the history of philosophy.
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1.2 ... and Logic as a Branch of Philosophy
From the modem point o f view, Frege’s characterization of the aims of 
logic is hopelessly outmoded and sounds quaintly philosophical. Although 
logic, alongside psychology, was the very last fledgling to leave the nest of 
philosophy, logic is today very much independent o f its mother. Modem 
logicians do not much care about finding the laws o f troth (or even the 
normative laws o f  correct reasoning); i f  logic is not practiced for its own 
sake (as the pure science o f formal symbolic systems), it has - like applied 
mathematics - become a discipline of abstract engineering, catering indis­
criminately to various special needs, among them those of philosophers. In 
the latter case, it is indeed called ‘philosophical logic’; but this must not 
blind one to the fact that there is nothing intrinsically philosophical about 
so-called ‘philosophical logic’.
If we take Frege in saying that logic is the science o f  the laws o f  truth as 
wanting to explicate the word ‘logic’, then our criticism will have to be that 
his explication departs too far from the presently given pre-explicatory, but 
nevertheless informed standard usage o f  the word, and is therefore not ade­
quate according to the standards of adequacy for explications laid down by 
Rudolf Camap. But this would certainly be unfair to Frege; for Frege in­
tends to explicate the word ‘logic’ under the restraint that logic has to be a 
branch of philosophy. He took logic to be necessarily a philosophical disci­
pline, a part o f  philosophy. Thus he is, rightly considered, not explicating 
the word ‘logic’, but the words ‘logic as a branch of philosophy’. In saying 
that logic is the science o f the laws of truth, Frege must today be taken to 
say that logic as a branch o f  philosophy is the science o f the laws o f  truth; 
for him, the tag ‘as a branch o f philosophy’ was simply redundant.
It is not fo r  us. But what Frege meant to say may still be correct. There 
certainly exists a part of present-day logical activity - a small part, and un­
fortunately, it seems to me, a more and more diminishing one - which is at 
the same time a part of philosophy. Due to tradition - in the past all o f  logic 
was a part o f philosophy - this small part o f  the sum total o f  present-day 
logical activity is still also singly called ‘logic’; but nowadays it would 
serve clarity to call it ‘logic as a  branch o f philosophy’.
1.3 ... and Classical vs. Non-Classical Logic
So it may be correct, as Frege holds, that logic - if  taken as a branch o f phi­
losophy - is the science of the laws of truth. But is it in fact correct? Cer­
tainly not uncontroversially. Philosophically-minded logical intuitionists 
hold that logic is the science o f  the laws o fprovability or o f justified assert­
ability. From their point o f  view, logic could be the science o f die laws of 
truth only i f  ‘true’ were co-extensional with ‘provable’ or with ‘justifiedly 
assertable’. But, in the normal sense o f the word, ‘true’ is certainly not co­
extensional with ‘provable’ or with ‘justifiedly assertable’, and it seems to
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me that Frege and most other people would wish to hold on to this aspect o f 
the normal sense of the word ‘true’. So would most logical intuitionists, but 
they would add that they do not find the concept of truth - as distinguished 
from provability and justified assertability - to be a particularly usefill one; 
they would urge us to get rid of it. For them, the axioms and theorems of 
their restricted - hence non-classical - calculi, e.g., of propositional logic, 
cannot be primarily or essentially laws of truth, and hence, for them, logic 
cannot be the science of the laws of truth.
Thus it is by no means philosophically uncontentious that logic is such 
a science. But again, it would be unfair to hold this against Frege’s defini­
tion. For Frege is clearly explicating the word ‘logic’ under the further re­
straint that logic - as a branch of philosophy - is identical to classical logic. 
Like the restraint that logic must be a branch o f philosophy, the restraint 
that logic is identical to classical logic was unrecognizable to Frege. The 
possibility that logic might offer alternatives to classical logic did not occur 
to him, just as the possibility did not occur to him that logic could be more 
than a branch of philosophy. Thus, when Frege says that logic is the science 
o f  the laws o f  truth, he must today be taken so say that classical logic - as a 
branch ofphilosophy - is the science o f  the laws o f  truth.
1.4 ... and Logicism vs. Elementary Logic
Obviously, Frege’s explicatory thesis about the nature of logic is gaining in 
plausibility, once the restrictions are made explicit that Frege tacitly, and 
indeed unconsciously, deposited into its meaning. In fact, by now Frege’s 
thesis seems so plausible as to appear trivial. Doesn’t classical logic center 
on truth and falsity, where these two concepts are, in addition, obeying the 
principle o f  bivalence (or in other words, where each of these concepts is 
the negation of the other)? But even if it is so, is this enough to make clas­
sical logic, even within philosophy, the science o f the laws of truth? For are 
such laws the primary objects of cognition for classical logic, or rather 
something else? Only if  such laws are indeed the primary objects o f cogni­
tion for classical logic, and not merely, as it were, by-products of its activi­
ties, can classical logic be indeed the science of the laws of truth.
At this point we should remember that Frege was also a philosopher of 
mathematics and went about - in the Grundgesetze der Arithmetik (Funda­
mental Laws o f  Arithmetic) - realizing the logicistic program of reducing 
arithmetic to logic. But the primary objects o f arithmetical cognition are 
surely not laws o f truth, but abstract structures: numbers and systems of 
numbers. Hence, from the point of view o f logicism, it is incongruent to 
regard laws o f truth as the primary objects o f logical cognition. If logicism 
is right, logic - that is, for Frege, classical logic, a branch o f philosophy - 
must at least sometimes be primarily concerned with other things than with 
laws o f truth - namely with the object-related truths about certain logical
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objects’, as Frege calls them. This difficulty for Frege’s definition o f  logic, 
which arises from the very aspirations he had for logic, points us, however, 
to yet another restriction Frege can be taken to be tacitly assuming when he 
is speaking of logic as being the science o f the laws o f truth: At least later 
in his career, by the word ‘logic’ Frege may very well be merely intending 
basic predicate logic, which o f course includes (truth-functional) proposi­
tional logic.
This further restriction is strongly suggested by the contents of the la­
test text in which his definition of logic occurs, the Logische Untersuchun­
gen (Logical Investigations), published in three installments between 1918 
and 1923 (I have quoted from the first installment above in Section 1). In 
the three published parts of Logische Untersuchungen Frege is exclusively 
concerned with central aspects of classical propositional logic. A fourth 
part, dedicated to classical predicate logic, and which would presumably 
have been mainly, if  not merely, concerned with its more elementary as­
pects, was begun by Frege, but not finished. Since in the fragment o f the 
fourth part he refers to the third part (which bears the title ‘Logische Unter­
suchungen. Dritter Teil: Das Gedankengefuge’ - ‘Logical Investigations. 
Third Part: The Thought-Structure’) as already published, Frege’s work on 
the Logische Untersuchungen was apparently cut short only by his death in 
1925.2
2  See the introduction by GOnther Patzig, the editor o f  Logache Untersuchungen, pp. 5-7.
3  In the fragment ‘Neuer Versuch der Grundlegung der Arithmetik’ ( ‘New Attempt to Found 
Arithmetic’) from 1924/25 he begins to attempt a geometrical foundation o f  arithmetic. But he 
also makes two striking statements (p. 298, my translation): ‘I had to give up the opinion that 
arithmetic is a branch o f  logic and that therefore in arithmetic everything has to be proved 
purely logically’ and (p. 299) ‘It seems that the logical source o f  cognition cannot by itself 
present us with objects’.
4  ‘properly speaking’, that is: without missing the entrenched part o f  the meaning o f  the 
word.
In order to give Frege’s explicatory definition o f logic the greatest 
chance of being correct or adequate, we may take him to be ultimately say­
ing, in saying that logic is the science of the laws o f truth, that classical 
elementary logic - as a branch of philosophy - is the science of the laws of 
truth. Indeed, at the end o f his life, he could well have arrived at the conclu­
sion that even if  arithmetic is a part o f some science which is a branch of 
philosophy, that science cannot properly speaking be called ‘logic’.3 And 
Frege would have been quite right in thinking so. Any science in which it is 
asserted (be it as an axiom or as a theorem) that there are infinitely many 
objects - a strange law of truth indeed! - cannot, properly speaking,4  be 
called ‘logic’, no matter whether that assertion refers to a universe o f  ob­
jects which is divided into hierarchically ordered layers, or to one that does 
not have this hierarchical structure that is so satisfying to the order-loving
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minds of modem proponents of logicism.5 And therefore, since arithmetic 
requires an infinity of objects, a science which is able to incorporate arith­
metic cannot, properly speaking, be logic. If that science is to be a branch 
of philosophy, it must be ontology, or in other words: general metaphysics.6
5 Cf. e.g. Franz v. Kutschera who in Kutschera 1985 takes Zermelo-Fraenkel axiomatic set 
theory to be logic (p. 225) since it is provably equivalent to the overtly hierarchical (or ‘induc­
tive’ - cf. pp. 210-212) system of Dana Scott (pp. 213-215, pp. 223-224).
® Frege could have arrived at this view - 1 am not saying that he did. Indeed it is rather un­
likely that he ever realized the metaphysical nature of his so-called logicism. The reason for 
this is the predominant Neo-Kantian anti-metaphysical atmosphere in Germany in the second 
half of the 19th century: Metaphysics and ontology were banished from philosophy, and any 
self-respecting philosopher, imbued by that atmosphere, could not allow himself to regard his 
position as ontological and his practice as ontology.
7  I am not saying that these issues are without philosophical interest. On the contrary, some 
results in this area are o f die greatest philosophical importancef or epistemology: the undecida­
bility o f predicate logic, the incompleteness of axiomatized arithmetic.
1.5 ... and Frege’s Elementary Oversight
Ironically, Frege’s logicistic program - the high aspirations he had for logic 
- may be said to have failed precisely because Frege did not pay enough 
attention to the results of classical elementary logic, that is, to precisely 
those homely laws of truth he apparently in the end meant to be all that 
logic is concerned with. The following is a theorem-schema o f elementary 
predicate logic: ->3yVx(R(x,y) = ->R(x,x)). Russell’s letter to Frege in 
which Russell formulated his famous antinomy, in effect, merely pointed 
out to Frege that he had violated this very law of truth, thus making his sys­
tem in the Grundgesetze der Arithmetik logically inconsistent. Never before 
had a logician been so tragically punished as a logician for having been 
blinded by a metaphysical hope! For Frege, this hope - to which he entirely 
dedicated himself without realizing its metaphysical, non-logical character - 
had been the ontological reduction of arithmetic to his ontological theory of 
functions and objects, and in particular Wertverlaufe {courses o f  values). 
For the realization of this hope he threw away a logician’s carefulness and 
wariness. I do not see how otherwise the inconsistency of his system could 
have remained hidden to him for such a long time.
1.6 ... and Intensionalism in Logic
But can we accept Frege’s ultimate, modest claim that classical elementary 
logic as a branch o f philosophy (and therefore without the heavy concentra­
tion on proof-theoretic and model-theoretic issues which is so characteristic 
o f modem logic and which has almost entirely replaced interest in the con­
tents o f the logical systems themselves)7, that logic thus regarded (I from 
now on leave tacit the modifier ‘as a branch of philosophy’) is the science 
o f the laws of truth?
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Since the scope of classical elementary logic is certainly too small to 
capture all laws o f truth (laws of truth involving modalities, for example, 
are outside its ken), we have to replace the phrase ‘the laws of truth’ by the 
phrase ‘the most basic laws of truth’, as is indeed suggested by Frege him­
self: In the fragment ‘Logik’ from 1897 he had said (see the quote in Sec­
tion 1 above) that logic is the science of the most general laws of truth. Pre­
sumably, what is most general is most basic, and vice versa.
Then there still remain two nagging closely related questions which we 
have already encountered in a modified form on the way to the present po­
sition: (1) Are the objects o f cognition o f classical elementary logic primar­
ily laws of truth? (2) Are the axioms and theorems of a system o f classical 
elementary logic - and in particular those o f a system o f classical proposi­
tional logic - primarily laws o f truth? Since the axioms and theorems of a 
system o f classical elementary logic are precisely the primary objects of 
cognition of classical elementary logic, the first question reduces to the sec­
ond; this question is what we now must concern us with.
To a student o f  logic who, in the spirit of Frege, has been taught the 
meaning of the classical sentence-connectives ‘and’, ‘or’ and ‘not’ by truth­
tables and who has then been made familiar with the utterly simple truth­
value semantics for classical elementary predicate logic - a semantics that 
does without a universe of discourse - the answer to question (2) may seem 
to be obvious: ‘Yes, the axioms and theorems of a calculus of classical ele­
mentary logic are primarily, essentially and naturally laws of truth, and 
indeed laws o f  truth without any ontological content whatsoever, albeit, 
pace Frege, they certainly contain more than a mere development o f the 
meaning of the word “ true” .’ However, even in Frege’s own works we can 
find a massive hint that the answer ‘Yes’ to the question at issue is not nec­
essarily correct. In the ‘Ausführungen über Sinn und Bedeutung’ (‘Exposi­
tions on Sense and Reference’, written between 1892 and 1895) we read 
(pp. 31-32, my translation): ‘The logicians o f content like only all too much 
to stop at the sense [the meaning]; for what they are calling content is, if  not 
perception, so certainly sense. They do not consider that what matters in 
logic is not how thoughts [propositions] result from thoughts, without re­
spect to the truth-value; they do not consider that the transition from the 
thought to the truth-value and - generally speaking - from the sense to the 
reference [literally, but misleadingly: the meaning] must be made, that the 
logical laws are primarily laws in the realm o f reference and only secondar­
ily pertain to sense.’ Frege does not explain why the necessity of making 
the transition from the sense to the truth-value requires that logical laws are 
primarily laws in the realm o f  reference. Even if  we agree with Frege that 
the truth-value o f  a sentence is its reference, there is no necessary connec­
tion between the two positions. Rather, a  ‘logician o f  content’ - or in other 
words: a proponent of intensionalism in logic - can agree with Frege that
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the transition from the thought to the truth-value, from the sense to the ref­
erence must be made, and yet deny that the logical laws are primarily laws 
in the realm of reference. For an intensionalistic logician, logical laws are 
primarily laws in the realm of sense, and only secondarily do they pertain to 
reference and hence to truth.
2 The Intensionalistic Characterization of Logic
It follows that for an intensionalistic logician the axioms and theorems o f a 
calculus o f classical elementary logic are neither primarily nor essentially 
laws of truth, although their applicability in the realm of truth and reference 
is o f course a highly important reason for our taking any interest at all in 
those axioms and theorems. Thus, regarding them as laws of truth is un­
doubtedly a natural, but nevertheless secondary perspective on them. If  this 
secondary perspective is made the primary one (as is done by Frege), then, 
for the intensionalistic logician, this is comparable to declaring that the 
principles o f physics are primarily laws for the building of rockets, televi­
sions, and nuclear weapons. Thus, even if intensionalistic logicians ac­
cepted the highly restricted Fregean range of the word ‘logic’, they would 
certainly deny that logic is the science of the most basic laws of truth; this 
denial would be as obvious to them as denying that physics is the science of 
the most basic laws o f technology is obvious to physicists. For the inten­
sionalistic logician logic is the science o f  the most basic meaning relations.
3 Intensionalistic Logical Validity and Consequence
Is Frege right, or the ‘logicians of content’? I will demonstrate for the sim­
ple case o f classical propositional logic that the cause of the intensionalists 
is a strong one, making good the expectation Adolf Reinach voiced in his 
1911 paper ‘Zur Theorie des negativen Urteils’ (‘On the Theory of the 
Negative Judgment’) (p. 251, my translation) ‘that large parts o f traditional 
logic will in their foundations prove to be general proposition theory [all- 
gemeine Sachverhaltslehre]’.8
8  I f  the foundations o f  logic are in question, it is more appropriate to translate Reinach's 
term ‘Sachverhalt’ by ‘proposition’ than by ‘state o f  affairs’ . Behind the intensionalist Reinach 
there stand the earlier intensionalists Husserl and Bolzano (as Wolfgang Künne emphasized in 
discussion).
I have already mentioned that there is no mention of truth in the axioms 
and theorems of logical systems. Much more importantly, there need not be 
any mention of truth in the semantics for such systems: The fundamental 
semantic concepts of logical validity and logical consequence can be intui­
tively satisfactorily defined without making any use of the concept of truth 
at all. All o f this is very well known under the heading of algebraic seman-
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tics-, but let me rehearse that part of it that concerns classical propositional 
logic in order to show that even there Frege’s definition of logic is not in­
contestable:
(1) Let L be a language of propositional logic, built in the usual manner 
on the basis of an infinity of propositional variables p, p', p", etc. by ap­
plying the sentence-connectives A, V, and brackets.
(2) An interpretation of L is a pair <W,V> consisting of a non-empty 
set of worlds W and a function V which assigns to every propositional vari­
able of L a subset of W, and to all other formulas of L a subset of W ac­
cording to the following stricture: For all formulas <p and vp of L: V(-><p) = 
W—V(<p), V(<pAV|/) = V(tp)nV(v), V(<pvt|/) = V(<p)uV(\p).
(3) <p is an L-logical consequence of := <p, yu  ... ,Vn are formu­
las of L, and for all interpretations <W,V> of L: V (y1)n...nV(\|/n)cV(tp).
(4) <p is L-logically valid := <p is an L-logical consequence of —><p.
Intuitively, (3) says that a formula <p of L is a logical consequence of for­
mulas \}/i,...,\pn o f L if and only if the proposition expressed by cp is inten- 
sionally contained in the proposition the conjunction of t|/i,...,\|/n expresses, 
no matter which particular propositions are expressed by <p and <gi,...,i|/n. 
Thus (3) encodes an intensionalistic conception of logical consequence, a 
conception which the ‘logicians of content’ would undoubtedly favor and 
which undoubtedly is intuitively at least as satisfactory as the orthodox ex- 
tensionalistic conception.9  Note that there is no mention of truth in the de- 
finiens of (3); all that is talked about is the propositional contents of certain 
formulas and how those contents are related. Given (3), it is clear that in (4) 
also the logical validity of a formula of L is defined merely in terms of the 
propositional contents of certain formulas and how those contents are re­
lated. There is no need whatever of the concept of truth. Nevertheless, the 
very same formulas and inferences of L turn out to be logically valid that 
are logically valid according to the orthodox extensionalistic semantics for 
L, and these formulas, axiomatized by some adequate calculus or other, are 
precisely those that form the canon of classical propositional logic. Thus we 
have a clear demonstration that the laws in this canon have no unseparable 
relation to truth. They are not essentially laws of truth, and, in view of the
9  Cf. the following remarkable passage from Reinach’s ‘Zu r Théorie des negativen Urteils’ 
(p. 222, my translation): ‘A ll connections o f  justification encountered by us in science or in 
daily life are connections o f  propositions. This is also true o f  the connections that are generally 
subsumed under the name o f  “ laws o f  inference” : They are, rightly regarded, nothing else but 
general nomological relations o f  propositions. The fundamental consequences that result from 
this insight for the construction o f  die science o f  logic are obvious.’
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intuitive satisfactoriness of definitions (3) and (4), it is more than doubtful 
whether they are at least primarily or naturally laws of truth.
4 Intensionalism with Truth Not Ignored
One might object that the intensionalistic conception of propositional logic 
is ontologically costly: Even if intensionalists who want to do propositional 
logic can get around assuming a plurality of possible worlds (in order to 
construe coarse-grained propositions simply as sets of worlds), they surely 
cannot get around positing propositions in some sense, together with an 
appropriate propositional algebra, as additional entities. To this I can 
merely say: So what? What is bad about propositions? And of course the 
ontological-economy-objection with respect to propositions is no objection 
Frege either would or could have raised. He was not an ontological scrooge. 
Ontological miserliness was not one of his vices, and, as we all know, his 
ontology comprises what he called thoughts, entities that, notwithstanding 
the word Frege used to designate them, have nothing to do with subjectiv­
ity, but are what we would call fine-grained propositions.
Indeed, it is hard to see what Frege could answer to a modem inten­
sionalistic logician, contesting in the way presented above Frege’s claim 
that logic is the science of the laws of truth. Presumably he would insist that 
the transition from sense to reference, from the thought to the truth-value 
must be effected. But modem intensionalistic logicians - whatever their 
forebears did, who according to Frege liked only all too much to stop at the 
sense10 - would be quite ready to comply with Frege and bring truth into 
the game - although not quite in the manner Frege had in mind.
1 0  Adolf Reinach, at least, is a notable exception to Frege’s allegation. Shortly before he (for 
the second time: cf. Section 3) envisions large parts of traditional logic as being founded on 
general proposition theory, he says (‘Zur Theorie des negativen Urteils’, p. 251, my transla­
tion): ‘A sentence is true if the corresponding proposition obtains. And two contradictory sen­
tences cannot both be true because two contradictory propositions cannot both obtain. Thus, 
also in this case the sentence-law leads back to a proposition-law. At the same time, we have 
here an example that illustrates in what sense we asserted above that large parts of traditional 
logic will in their foundations prove to be general proposition theory.’
The above semantics for classical propositional logic can be made to 
yield laws of truth, and indeed not merely in the trivial sense that every 
sentential part of a principle of classical propositional logic can, without 
changing its meaning, be prefixed with the words ‘it is true that’ (or with a 
symbol having the meaning of this phrase). For this purpose we re-define 
what is an interpretation of the language L as follows:
(2*) An interpretation of L is a triplet <W,o>,V> consisting of a non­
empty set o f worlds W, a subset co of W, and a function V which assigns to 
every propositional variable of L a subset of W, and to all other formulas of
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L a subset of W according to the following stricture: For all formulas <p and 
v|/ of L: V(-,<p) = W-V(<p), V(<pA\|/) = V(<p)nV(y), V(<pvy) = 
V f i p / W
We can then define the concept of truth in an interpretation for formu­
las <p of L as follows:
(5) <p is true in <W,©,V> := <W,©,V> is an interpretation of L, and 
©cV(<p).
The intuitive meaning of this definition is the following: A formula <p of L 
is true (in an interpretation <W,©,V> of L) if and only if the proposition 
that <p expresses (in that interpretation) is intensionally contained in the 
proposition which is the intersection (or intensional sum) of all obtaining 
propositions (for that interpretation). If  we want to derive, on the basis of 
(5) and (2*), the classical truth-conditions for the propositional connectives, 
and indeed all the metalinguistic laws of truth one would normally assume 
for them (these metalinguistic laws, not certain object-language formulas, 
really deserve the designation ‘[logical] law of truth’!), then we need to add 
one extra condition for © to (2*): © is a singleton set (in other words: © can 
be reduced to precisely one possible world in W). If we allow © to be 
empty, then we cannot prove: For all interpretations <W,©,V> o /L  and 
formulas <p o f  L: <p or —Kp is not true in <W,©,V>. And if we allow © to 
have more than one element, then we cannot, for example,* 12 prove: For all 
interpretations <W,©,V> o /L  and formulas <p o/L : <p or —i<p is true in 
<W,©,V>. But already if we simply take (2*) as it is, without any extra 
condition for ©, then we can prove for all and only the principles it of clas­
sical propositional logic (as formulated in L and as codified in an appropri­
ate axiomatic system): 7t is true in every interpretation <W,©,V> o/L.
' '  Additional clauses can be added for m odal extensions o f  L: V(d<p)=W, if  V(<p)=W, and
V(D<p)=0, if  V(<p)*W; V(D*q>)=W, i f  cocV(cp), and V(O*<p)=0, if  not <ocV(q>).
1 2  Another law o f  truth that is not provable if  co has more than one element is the following: 
F or a ll  interpretations <W,co,V> o f t .  andform ulas <p an d  o f  L: i f  cpvcg is true in <W,co,V>, 
then <p or  vp is true in <W,co,V>.
5 What is Primary: Intensional Containment or Truth?
The upshot of this is that Frege could not accuse the modem ‘logicians of 
content’ of disregarding the importance of truth for logic. Nevertheless, 
laws of truth, such as those presented above, are for the intensionalistic 
logician no more than a most welcome side-effect of logic, which, however, 
is primarily concerned with laws of meaning relations.
Whether Frege’s view of logic is to be preferred or that of the inten- 
sionalists at this point crucially depends on the question whether the central 
concept of the intensionalists, the intensional containment of one proposi-
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tion by another, can be understood without even tacitly presupposing the 
concept o f truth. Now, the proposition that the apple is colored intension- 
ally contains the proposition that the apple is extended.13 Does this need 
any gloss in terms of truth? For example the gloss: the sentence ‘the apple 
is colored’ cannot be true without the sentence ‘the apple is extended’ being 
true? Or the alternative gloss: it cannot be true that the apple is colored 
without it being true that the apple is extended? It seems to me the inten- 
sionalists would be within their rights if they asserted the concept of inten- 
sional containment to be primitive and sufficiently clear, and if they added: 
‘The sentence “ the apple is colored” cannot be true without the sentence 
“ the apple is extended”  being true because the proposition that the apple is 
colored intensionally contains the proposition that the apple is extended, 
and the direction of explanation is not the other way round, as is ground­
lessly presumed by the extensionalists.’
13 Both propositions concern the same apple and the same moment of time.
14  Indeed (as Gottfried Gabriel pointed out in discussion) there are unmistakable intension­
alistic leanings in Frege’s last published work Logische Untersuchungen, especially in its third 
installment ‘Gedankengefiige’, where the connectives ‘and’ and ‘not’ are clearly taken to ex­
press propositional functions (functions that form propositions - thoughts • from propositions) 
- cf. pp. 72-73 - and true and false as logical objects play only a minor role. Apparently 
Frege’s final move towards intensionalism is connected with his abandoning the logicistic 
program (or more generally speaking: with his abandoning his belief in logical objects', cf. 
Footnote 3).
1 5  See 'Der Gedanke’, p. 33 (my translation): ‘And when we call a sentence true, we really 
mean its sense.’
6 Frege and Three Uses of ‘True’
Since Frege employed the concept of proposition (under the name of 
‘thought’) and believed in the existence of propositions, Frege - even given 
the paramount importance he accorded to truth in logic - might have be­
come reconciled with logical intensionalism, i f  he only could have seen a 
viable method of defining truth in an intensionalistic framework.14 But he 
never succeeded in seeing any method of defining truth, he never even suc­
ceeded in seeing truth as an analyzable property. Frege really did not have 
any very clear idea o f truth, and hence of laws of truth, at all.
The reason for this is that Frege never clearly distinguished the two fun­
damental and fundamentally different object-language uses of the word 
‘true’ from each other (he did distinguish from them the metalinguistic use, 
where ‘true’ is applied as a predicate to sentences, but considered it secon­
dary and did not pay much attention to it)1 5 : the ontological use where 
‘true’ is applied as a predicate to propositions, and that use where ‘true’ 
merely functions as a semantically redundant monadic sentence-connective 
(but is employed in order to make an assertion more emphatic). Listen to
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this passage from ‘Der Gedanke’ (p. 34, my translation): ‘It is also remark­
able that the sentence “ I smell the odor of violets” has the same content as 
the sentence “ It is true that I smell the odor of violets” . Thus nothing 
seems to be added to the thought [proposition] by my attributing the prop­
erty of truth to it. And yet, is it not a great success when after long hesita­
tion and arduous investigations the researcher can finally say “ what I sur­
mised is true” ? The meaning of the word “ true” seems to be completely 
singular. Could it be that we are here concerned with something that cannot 
be called a property in the ordinary sense at all? In spite of this doubt, I will 
for the time being in accordance with ordinary usage continue to express 
myself as if truth were a property until something more appropriate will 
have been found.’ Here Frege does not realize that it makes a fundamental 
difference whether the sentence ‘It is true that I smell the odor of violets’ is 
parsed as (1) ‘It is true that’ + T smell the odor of violets’, or as (2) ‘It is 
true’ + ‘that I smell the odor of violets’. According to the first parsing, 
nothing, indeed, is added to the (cognitive) meaning of ‘I smell the odor of 
violets’, nor does the first parsing exhibit an attribution of a property to a 
thought. According to the second parsing, however, something is obviously 
added to the meaning of ‘that I smell the odor of violets’ - after all, the sen­
tence ‘it is true that I smell the odor of violets’ is not synonymous to the 
phrase ‘that I smell the odor of violets’; in fact, the second parsing, being a 
subject-and-predicate parsing, does exhibit an attribution of a property to a 
thought: The property of being true is attributed to the thought that I  smell 
the odor o f violets.16 Frege could not see this because he kept confusing the 
second parsing with the first. In a passage parallel to the one cited above, in 
the much earlier (1892) paper ‘Über Sinn und Bedeutung’ (‘On Sense and 
Reference’), he already insisted (p. 49, my translation) ‘that the relationship 
of the thought to the true must not be compared with that of the subject to 
the predicate’. He really did not have any good reason for holding this.
1 6  Thus the sentence ‘it is true that I smell the odor of violets’ is indeed ambiguous: It has 
two different meanings, corresponding to the two different ways in which it can be parsed. Yet, 
‘it is true that <1 smell the odor of violets>’ must be true if ‘it is true <that I smell the odor of 
violets>’ is true, and vice versa. (But note that an ontological skeptic with respect to the exis­
tence of propositions could doubt the vice versa'.) Hence the two disambiguated sentences 
resulting from ‘it is true that I smell the odor of violets’ stand in the same semantical relation­
ship towards each other in which ‘d  is an equilateral triangle’ and ‘d  is an equiangular triangle’ 
stand: The latter two sentences have different meanings, but neither one of them can be true 
without the other being true.
7 The Definability of ‘True’, pace Frege, and the True
All three common uses of the word ‘true’ - the redundant, the ontological 
and the metalinguistic one - are easily definable for large fragments of natu­
ral language:
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For ‘A ’ sentences are substitutable, for > ’ names of propositions, for 
‘5’ names of sentences:
It is true that A := A.
It is true(p)17 —p  is a fact (p obtains,/? is the case).18 
(‘that A ’ - being a name for a proposition - is substitutable for ‘p ’!) 
s is true := the proposition expressed by s is a fact.
That is: 'This is true: p ’, or more idiomatically: 'p is true .
1 8  Not all propositions are facts. For example, that Munich is the capital of Germany in 
1998 is not a fact (this is much better than saying that it is a non-existent fact), and therefore, 
according to definition, that Munich is the capital of Germany in 1998 is not true.
1 9  See ‘Über Sinn und Bedeutung’, pp. 48-49.
Frege presumably would have objected what was mentioned above (in Sec­
tion 1): that we already need to presuppose th® notion of truth in order to 
apply the definiens of any definition of truth in any given case. But this is 
not a good objection. For instead of asking ourselves whether it is true that 
the definiens applies in any given case, we can simply ask ourselves 
whether it applies. Or Frege might have objected that the above definitions 
offer mere Synonyma for ‘true’? But this can hardly be the case since they 
make the concept of truth clearer than it was before, and certainly clearer 
than it was to Frege himself.
For him, curiously, laws of truth must be laws concerning a certain ob­
ject (Gegenstand), the true, which is a saturated entity and hence cannot be 
a property.19 It is not amiss to see how Frege’s rather unnatural (but techni­
cally useful) notion of object truth-values, o f truth and falsity as objects, 
can be fitted into an intensionalistic framework: If  we employ a framework 
of coarsely individuated propositions, then we can quite naturally identify 
the true with the tautological proposition, and the false with the contradic­
tory proposition (propositions, being saturated entities, are after all objects 
in Frege’s sense).
8 What Remains
Frege’s main motivation for claiming that logic is the science of the laws of 
truth was his opposition to psychologism. This is quite clear from the con­
texts in which his claim occurs. But psychologism being long since de­
feated, to what uses can we put today Frege’s dictum that logic is the sci­
ence of the laws of truth?
Even if it surely cannot serve as a generally acceptable characterization 
of logic, o f its subject matter and its aims, even in its more elementary and 
traditional parts, Frege’s definition of logic certainly draws our attention 
again to the fact that we are interested in logic to a high degree because its 
application in truth-directed investigations points us from truths to further
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truths. This, certainly, is why money ought to be spent for logic. Moreover, 
what is not acceptable as a characterization of logic as a whole may never­
theless serve as a heading or slogan for a partisan movement or interesting 
research program within logic. Truth-value semantics and other approaches 
o f ontological minimalism20  could very well adopt this battle-cry against 
more ontologically-minded directions in logic: Logic is the science o f  the 
laws o f  truth, and o f nothing else - or if it is not, let us see to what extent it 
can be treated in an ontologically neutral manner.
2 0  See Meixner 1995. Concerning truth-value semantics, see Leblanc 1983, pp. 189-274, in 
particular p. 191.
2 1  Translations into English o f  the cited papers by Frege can be found in: Collected Papers 
on Mathematics, Logic, and Philosophy, ed. B. McGuiness, Oxford: Blackwell 1984; Posthu­
mous Writings, eds. H. Hennes et al., Oxford: Blackwell 1979.
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